Numerous theoretical models posit that income is negatively correlated with support for violent political organizations either because of low opportunity costs to participation or because those who feel excluded from and disadvantaged by the existing political hierarchy are more likely to support non-state actors trying to disrupt it. Recent empirical research on terrorism in South Asia and the Middle East has challenged this perspective. Consistent with this new body of empirical scholarship, we posit that feelings of relative depravation should be negative related to support for violent political action because militant organizations impose externalities that fall most heavily on people of low socioeconomic status. We extend existing empirical studies by estimating the causal effects that feelings of relative poverty and perceptions of violence have on support for militant groups using an original, large-scale survey experiment in Pakistan in which we randomly manipulated feelings of poverty and perceptions of violence. Consistent with our theoretical argument, we find that relative poverty and perceived violence reduce support for violent militant organizations. These findings have important implications not only for scholarship on political violence but also for national security and counterterrorism policy. * We thank Eli Berman, Graeme Blair, Mike Callen, Patrick Kuhn, Paul Staniland, and seminar participants at the University of Chicago and Yale for their helpful comments and feedback. All errors are our own. This research was supported, in part, by the U. Existing research has mainly relied on conditional correlations in observational data to make causal claims about the relationship between socioeconomic status and support for militancy. While these findings are informative, the next important step is to assess whether such effects are causal, particularly given the competing hypotheses in the literature. At first glance this presents a major challenge as one cannot randomly assign socioeconomic status or levels of violence to individuals.
The relationship between socioeconomic status and support for political violence has been long studied by political scientists (e.g., Gurr 1970; Sambanis 2005; Blattman and Miguel 2010) and is of extreme interest to policy makers. 1 Numerous theoretical models posit that income is negatively correlated with support for violent political organizations, either because income increases the opportunity costs of participation (Gates 2002; Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011) or because those who feel excluded from and disadvantaged by the existing political hierarchy are more likely to support non-state actors trying to disrupt it (Paige 1975; Scott 1976) . Some recent research supports these models, showing that Western European nations with more generous welfare programs to protect citizens from poverty experience less terrorism (Burgoon 2006 ) and that major negative economic shocks lead to increased religious intensity and violence (Chen 2007 (Chen , 2010 .
Scholars of terrorism, however, have challenged this reasoning and contended that poverty is unrelated to support for participation in Islamist groups and is correlated with opposition to terrorism in some places (Berrebi 2007; Krueger 2007; Shafiq and Sinno 2010 ). 2 Leveraging individual-level survey data and aggregate-level statistics on political violence in Pakistan, argue that poor individuals hold militants in lower regard than middle-class Pakistanis because they suffer externalities from militant violent activity.
Existing research has mainly relied on conditional correlations in observational data to make causal claims about the relationship between socioeconomic status and support for militancy. While these findings are informative, the next important step is to assess whether such effects are causal, particularly given the competing hypotheses in the literature. At first glance this presents a major challenge as one cannot randomly assign socioeconomic status or levels of violence to individuals.
Many of the underlying individual-level mechanisms posited in the literature, however, are fundamentally psychological ; that is, it is people's perceptions of poverty and violence that drive support.
Consequently, devising approaches to exogenously change people's perceptions of their own circumstances and of the external environment may present an important opportunity to establish causal relationships. Our approach is inspired by a long tradition in experimental social psychology of 1 The consensus among policy makers has moved away from the simplistic view that poverty predicts support for militants to one which posits that poor and marginalized individuals are more vulnerable to extremist ideologies and that economic grievances aid militants' recruitment efforts (see e.g Lord, Nagl and Rosen 2009; United States Agency for International Development 2011).
2 Bueno de Mesquita (2005) outlines why there may be a positive correlation between national level poverty and terrorist violence even though terrorists are not recruiting poor individuals. manipulating perceptions of the status quo when it is not possible to directly manipulate the status quo for ethical or other practical reasons. 3 This paper implements such an approach. We designed and conducted an original, large-scale (n = 16, 279), face-to-face survey in Pakistan which featured embedded experiments in which we manipulated people's perceptions of individual socioeconomic status and levels of militant violence.
By varying individuals' perceptions of where they are in the income distribution and of how violent Pakistan is relative to neighboring countries, we provide the first experimental evidence on the impact of poverty and terrorist violence on attitudes towards militant organizations.
Our results are consistent with previous findings that combatants pay a cost for causing civilian casualties in the context of insurgencies in terms of reducing popular support (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro 2011; Afzal 2012; which in turn may limit their ability to produce violence in the future as citizens share more (or less) data with government forces (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Condra et al. 2010) . The results also highlight the potential for complex interactions between individuals' economic conditions and how they interpret the behavior of political actors. In our case, it appears those who feel more economically vulnerable are more sensitive to information about how violent their country is relative to others. These findings suggest the need to incorporate the costs of political violence into theories linking poverty to support for militancy.
Before discussing our research design, we present a theoretical overview of how poverty and violence contribute to individual-level support for violent political organizations, followed by relevant background information about the landscape of militant politics in Pakistan. We then describe details of our survey methodology, our approaches for measuring the dependent variable (support for militant groups) and the independent variables of interest (experimental manipulations that induced variance in perceptions of poverty and violence). Finally, we present our results and discuss their implications for theories of conflict and public policy.
Theoretical Overview
This section reviews theoretical arguments about why individuals support violent political organizations and then discusses evidence on: (1) the relationship between economic conditions and support for political violence; and (2) how the actions of terrorist organizations impact support.
The literature on why individuals support violent organizations has long focused primarily on participation in violence. Many accounts cite grievances, such as dashed economic expectations (Gurr 1970) , ethnic hostilities (Horowitz 1985) , and incursions by the state (Scott 1976) as key motivations for participating in political violence. Psychological theories of conflict also focus on the importance of grievances in determining support for violent groups. For instance, Moghaddam (2005) claims participation in terrorism requires six distinct steps, the first of which is to begin perceiving one's material conditions as unfair, a feeling that can be abetted by being poor but is also entirely possible among the middle class and wealthy. Individuals who see no clear solution for social mobility may begin to develop an us-versus-them mentality, displacing their frustration and aggression onto a perceived enemy. From there, individuals may begin to see terrorism as a justified solution to their problems and become ripe candidates for recruitment by terrorist organizations.
These accounts suggest that individuals tend to support violent political organizations when they have grievances and when they think that the organization will provide a means through which to redress their grievances. Therefore, for individuals to support violent organizations, they must view the organization as part of the solution, not see them as exacerbating existing problems.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, public opinion research on the relationship between poor economic conditions and support for violent groups does not generally find a positive relationship.
In one of the earliest studies to directly assess the relationship between socioeconomic status and the attitudes of non-militants in a setting with militant violence, Guimond and Dubé-Simard (1983) used a survey experiment to show that making Francophones from Montreal feel like there was a wider economic difference between them and Anglophones in Quebec did not increase feelings of relative deprivation or dissatisfaction. In a more recent study, Tessler and Robbins's (2007) study of Algeria and Jordan finds that personal economic circumstances do not predict attitudes toward terrorism directed at the United States. These findings extend to participation in terrorism. Krueger and Malekova (2003) and Berrebi (2007) do not observe a positive relationship between socioeconomic status at the individual level and participation in terrorism; on the contrary, terrorist operatives tend to come from middle-class or wealthy families. Other studies have reached different conclusions. Using Pew's Global Attitudes Survey (GATS) data, Shafiq and Sinno (2010) and Chiozza (2007) find that the relationship between individual-level income and support for suicide bombing varies across countries, while Mousseau (2011) finds that support for terrorism is highest among the urban poor.
Using recent evidence from Pakistan, directly address the link between individual-level economic condition and support for militant groups by showing that the lower socioeconomic class is in fact less supportive of militant groups than the middle class. Leveraging data on incidents of political violence in Pakistan, they find that lower class individuals experience more negative externalities from militant group violence, which may help explain the patterns of support in that context. These findings suggest that considering the costs of violence experienced by different socioeconomic groups may help explain the divergent results in the extant literature.
We expect this relationship between the costs of violence and support for militancy to be true across all income levels; however, the negative externalities of violence fall unevenly across classes for a number of reasons. First, terrorism at the national level disproportionately impacts the lower class. Terrorism has been found to reduce economic growth (see, e.g., Gaibulloev and Sandler 2009 ) and distort domestic spending (Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 2004) . The poor also disproportionately experience negative health impacts from civil wars and insurgency (Collier 2009; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2003) . Second, the poor may be exposed to more violent incidents, as found is the case in Pakistan, where the lower class tend to be concentrated in densely populated urban areas targeted by militants. These areas are likely less equipped to deal with the externalities of violence in terms of infrastructure and healthcare, and the poor have fewer opportunities for mobility to less violent areas than the middle and upper class. As civilians experience more costs of violence, they will be less likely to see the militant group as a solution to their grievances but rather as a source of the problem. Thus, the costs of violence may interact with economic conditions in determining support for violent political groups.
Background on Islamist Militant Politics in Pakistan
Islamist militant groups have long been a feature of Pakistani politics, both in terms of the state using proxies to achieve foreign policy goals in neighboring countries and in terms of Islamist militants engaging in political activity and violence within Pakistan itself. We evaluate support for three militant groups: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Pakistan Taliban (also known as the TTP), and the Afghan Taliban. There are certainly other militant groups of interest such as Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which attract even greater attention than the organizations we studied. Unfortunately, as we discovered during pretesting and focus groups, it was nearly impossible to investigate support for these groups in early-2012, even using our more cautious indirect approach, due to heightened sensitivity about their actions. Nonetheless, the three groups we did ask about are extremely important to Pakistani and international security.
Both the SSP and the TTP have killed thousands of Pakistanis in the last decade and the Pakistani army has fought a series of limited campaigns against the TTP resulting in thousands of casualties and leading to substantial refugee flows (Ghufran 2009 (Ghufran , 1108 . As is well known, Pakistani support to the Afghan Taliban remains one of the most problematic issues as the United States seeks to draw down its military presence in Afghanistan. Many observers fear that as soon as the U.S.
withdraws, Pakistan will again work to prop up some reconstructed version of the Taliban, rendering Afghanistan a sanctuary for Islamist militants operating in the region and globally (Kerry 2011 ).
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Since the late 1970s, Pakistan has been home to brutal domestic, sectarian Islamist militants that share overlapping networks and membership with similar groups acting outside of Pakistan.
These sectarian groups (e.g., the SSP and its offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)), are most notorious for targeting Pakistan's Shias, Ahmedis, and other religious minorities. While sectarian violence has long been a feature of South Asian domestic politics, these particular groups have their origins in the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, as well as General Zia ul Haq's domestic efforts to render Pakistan a Sunni Islamic state. While these groups primarily focus their violent tactics upon Pakistan's non-Sunni and non-Deobandi citizens, they have also collaborated with other militant groups, such as the Afghan Taliban and some Indiaoriented militant groups (Zahab and Roy 2004; Zahab 2002; Nasr 2000) . SSP has also collaborated locally with Al Qaeda.
The Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP)) Mixed gender teams traveled to each primary sampling unit (PSU). Female enumerators traveled in groups accompanied by the field supervisor, while male enumerators traveled in teams of two.
Female interviewers conducted surveys with female respondents, while male interviewers conducted surveys with male respondents. This procedure was intended to accommodate concerns about safety and social custom.
In the four normal provinces of Pakistan, we surveyed district-representative samples of 155-675 households in 61 districts: 15 in Balochistan, 14 in KPK, 12 in Sindh, and 20 in Punjab. Within each province we sampled the two largest districts and then chose additional districts using a simple random sample. In the FATA, we collected agency-representative samples of 270-675 people in each of the six agencies where our enumerators could travel. Samples within districts/agencies were purchased from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics which used their most recent sampling frames. Since Pakistan has experienced substantial, heterogeneous population growth since the last census in 1998 we do not calculate post-stratification weights. Our results should therefore be taken as representative for our sample which, while large, does over-represent Pakistanis from the smaller provinces. The overall response rate was 71%, with 14.5% of households contacted refusing to take the survey and 14.5% of the targeted households not interviewed because no one was home.
This response rate rivals those of high-quality academic surveys in the United States such as the American National Election Study (ANES).
We conducted two large-scale pre-tests of the survey instrument. We first pre-tested a restricted 20 minute questionnaire with a sample of 1,084 respondents in two cities of Punjab (Lahore and Attock) from July 1 to July 27, 2011. This first pre-test focused on measuring income, knowledge about militant groups, and on evaluating the three experiments described below. Respondents were informally debriefed by the enumerators after each survey and the results reported by the field coordinators each week. We found respondents quite willing to discuss the endorsement questions but reluctant to answer an extended income battery. We revised the income battery substantially after this pre-test and altered the comparison groups for the perceived violence experiment. Our second pre-test involved testing a slightly different restricted questionnaire with a total sample of 1,215 respondents in Peshawar and Karachi from October 28 to November 15, 2011. Here we focused on testing a battery measuring political knowledge as well as validating the revised perceived violence experiment and checking that the endorsement experiment worked in Peshawar and Karachi where militant violence is more common than in Punjab. The pre-test indicated that the survey instrument was functioning reliably and was ready to be fielded on the full sample.
Research Design
This section outlines our research design. We first explain the endorsement experiment we implemented to measure the key dependent variable of support for militant groups. We then describe the two experiments in which we exogenously vary two key independent variables: relative poverty and beliefs about the intensity of violence in Pakistan. In each section we describe the methodology of statistically analyzing the experiment.
The Endorsement Experiment
Design Asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations has numerous problems in places suffering from political violence. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can be unsafe for enumerators and respondents to discuss such issues. Second, item non-response rates to such sensitive questions are often quite high given that respondents fear that providing the "wrong" answer will threaten their own and their family's safety. Third, responses may be subject to social desirability bias; people may answer in ways they think will appease high-status enumerators. We therefore used an endorsement experiment to measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations. Endorsement experiments were first used in a conflict area to study support for political violence by In this case we conducted the experiment as follows:
• Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or a control group (one-fifth of the sample was assigned to each group).
• Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a five-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for the analysis. 7
• Respondents in the treatment group were asked identical questions but were then told that one of four people/militant organizations supports the policy in question (SSP, Pakistan Taliban, 7 We recode all variables to lie between 0 and 1 so we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a 100β percentage point change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value of the independent variable to the largest possible value. For independent variables representing experimental conditions, the regression coefficient tells us the effect size of the treatment effect in percentage point terms.
Afghan Taliban, Abdul Sattar Edhi). Each of the four treatment groups was associated with one of these four actors. The purpose of including Edhi, a well-known humanitarian, is that he is a broadly popular figure in Pakistan. Thus, if the endorsement experiment is working then his endorsement should increase support for the policies on average. The Edhi endorsement effect also provides a baseline against which to compare the effect of militant group endorsements.
• The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect towards the militant groups/Edhi, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.
This approach of making the policy (rather than the militant organization) the primary object of evaluation has several advantages. First, when the object of evaluation is a policy, concerns about social desirability bias are lessened because respondents (particularly those of lower class, ethnicity, or social status, or those from sectarian or communal minorities) are not asked to explicitly and directly divulge their beliefs about militants. Second, in addition to mitigating social desirability effects, this approach may also mitigate the inclination to not respond to the question at all due to fear of these groups. Third, this type of question reduces security threats to the enumerators who sometimes encounter militant groups, Pakistani intelligence outfits, or their representatives while in the field. Such third parties appear to see this approach as less injurious to their interests because they believe the instrument queries policies and not groups. Ideally, respondents should consider questions about a policy endorsed by a group to be no more sensitive than being asked about the policy alone. Even if this approach does not completely remove social desirability bias, it provides a potential improvement on direct questions as long as the difference in sensitivity between endorsement conditions is less than that invoked by direct questions.
The endorsement experiment draws on extensive research on persuasion in social psychology (see Petty and Wegener 1998 for a review). Individuals are more likely to be persuaded and influenced by likeable sources (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Cialdini 1993) . Endorsements of policies and positions are much more effective when an individual has positive affect toward the source of the endorsement (Wood and Kallgren 1988; Chaiken 1980; Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann 1983) .
As O' Keefe (1990) summarizes: "Liked sources should prove more persuasive than disliked sources" (107). Accordingly, the effectiveness of an endorsement in shifting views on a policy indicates the level of support for the endorser.
We identified policies for the experiment by closely perusing Pakistani domestic press accounts and vetted them for suitability through pre-testing of the survey and through focus groups. We chose real policies which were relatively well known but about which Pakistanis were unlikely to have extremely hardened opinions such that they had the potential to be swayed by the endorsements.
After extensive pre-testing and focus groups to ensure that the candidate policies met the above criteria, we settled upon four contemporary policy proposals in Pakistan: (1) plans to bring in the army to deal with the violence in Karachi; (2) "mainstreaming" the FATA; (3) using peace jirgas to solve outstanding bilateral disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan including the conflict over the Durand Line; and (4) engaging in a dialogue with India over bilateral issues. 8
The question wordings for the four issues were:
• Violence in Karachi. "As you may know, in recent months, Karachi has suffered continuous and intense violence. The police have been unable to stop the violence. Some politicians and people want the army to come in to deal with the violence and the extremists. Some say this is a good idea, some say it is a bad idea. How much do you support such a policy?"
• Mainstreaming the FATA. "As you may know, in recent years, there have been discussions about "mainstreaming" FATA (qabaili ilaqe) and abolishing the British-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). For example, some have discussed making FATA (qabaili ilaqa) a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and extending Pakistan's constitution to this area. Some say this is a good idea, some say it is a bad idea. How much do you support such a policy?"
• Durand Line. "As you may know, the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan is known as the Durand Line. Afghanistan disputes this border and even claims parts of Pakistan as its own territory. The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes including the location of the border. Some say this is a good idea, some say it is a bad idea. How much do you support such a policy?"
8 We considered the possibility that people living in the FATA would respond differently to the policy question about normalization of their region and therefore may have hardened positions. When we compared responses in the treatment condition on question (2) between the FATA and the rest of the country the differences were modest. In the FATA 61% of our respondents said they supported mainstreaming "a lot" or "a great deal." Outside of the FATA 55% were in those categories, a modest difference (p = .37 clustering at the PSU level). The difference in means between the two groups was even smaller at .16 on a 5-point scale (p = .44). Moreover, all treatment effects analyzed only on the FATA question did not differ between FATA residents and the rest of the sample.
• Dialogue with India. "As you may know, there are ongoing efforts between the Indian and Pakistani governments to resolve their difference through dialogue. This has resulted in various meetings over the last several years among Indian and Pakistani officials in both India and Pakistan. The Pakistan Government's policy is to continue engage India in this dialogue. Some say this is a good idea, some say it is a bad idea. How much do you support such a policy?"
Respondents reported support for the policies on a five-point response scale: "a great deal," "a lot," "a moderate amount," "a little," "not at all." The control group received the questions as they appeared above; the treatment group was also provided an endorsement of one of the four individuals/groups immediately before being asked their support: "[Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP)/The Pakistan Taliban/The Afghan Taliban/Abdul Satter Edhi] have/has voiced support for this policy."
We also had to determine which groups we could include in the Endorsement Experiment. As discussed above, our extensive pre-testing revealed that some groups were too sensitive to ask about even using this indirect approach (including al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat ud Dawa) due to high non-response and because the enumerators felt sufficiently uneasy about including these groups that they performed differently while posing those questions than they did for the rest of the questionnaire.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical estimation of the endorsement effects (via OLS regression) is straightforward:
where i indexes respondents, P i is the average level of policy support for the four items, E i is a dummy variable coded "1" for respondents receiving a given endorsement and "0" for respondents in the control group, and i represents stochastic error. The parameter of interest is β, which tells us how much the endorsement by a group or actor increased/decreased support for the policies on average. Because the endorsement treatment was assigned at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level, standard errors are clustered at that level. 9 As we discuss below, we can include demo-9 Our survey was administered on paper under challenging circumstances and we had at least one respondent mis-graphic controls in equation (1) to improve efficiency of the estimation and adjust for any covariate imbalance that might occur due to chance (Gerber and Green 2012) . 10
Diagnostic Checks
We also implemented a series of diagnostic checks to see if the Endorsement Experiment was working as intended. First, although we were not able to ask directly about the militant groups due to the safety concerns described above, we were directly able to ask about support for Edhi:
"How much do you support Abdul Satter Edhi and his work?" (response options: "a great deal," "a lot," "a moderate amount," "a little," "not at all"). Accordingly, respondents who stated explicit support for Edhi should have more strongly positive endorsement effects than respondents who did not report explicit support. This difference also allows us to map the size of the endorsement effect onto a Likert scale, making it easier to substantively interpret for the militant groups. Second, a concern that one might have about the Endorsement Experiment is that the endorsements themselves change people's interpretation of the policies. This seems unlikely since the policies were explained in intricate detail and not simply by their taglines (e.g. "What do you think about mainstreaming the FATA?"). Accordingly, we asked a nine-item general political knowledge quiz to respondents (see Online Appendix 2). The content of the quiz was similar to those found in American political behavior research (e.g., identifying which party controls the government, who holds certain offices, etc.). The Endorsement Experiment would not be working properly if respondents with pre-treatment knowledge of the policies exhibited smaller endorsement effects, since this would suggest that the endorsement actually provides substantive information about the policy, instead of it tapping support for the endorser.
assigned on at least one experimental condition in 11% of our PSUs. We concatenated actual PSUs with treatment assignment in such cases and clustered at the PSU×treatment level. This increases the number of clusters from 1,108 to 1,267 PSUs. As these mis-assignments were uncorrelated with any observables they do not affect our identifying assumption of random assignment. Dropping all PSUs with at least one mis-assignment slightly increases standard errors but does not change any of the substantive results. 10 In using OLS instead of the IRT-based approach in Bullock, Imai and Shapiro (2011) or Blair, Lyall and Imai (2013) we lose a bit of power, meaning that our choice of estimators is a conservative one, but gain in expositional simplicity.
The Relative Poverty Experiment

Design
To assess whether feelings of relative deprivation increased support for militant groups, we designed and administered the Relative Poverty Experiment. The basic idea behind this experiment is that although we cannot easily manipulate whether people are poor, we perhaps can manipulate whether people feel poor. We did this by asking respondents "What is the approximate monthly income of your household?" and randomly assigned them to two different sets of response options:
• Relative Wealth Condition. Less than 2500 Rs (rupees); 2,501 to 5,000 Rs; 5,001 to 10,000
Rs; 10,001 to 15,000 Rs; 15,001 to 25,000 Rs; More than 25,000 Rs
• Relative Poverty Condition. Less than 15,000 Rs; 15,001 to 25,000 Rs; 25,001 to 35,000 Rs; 35,001 to 45,000 Rs; 45,001 to 60,000 Rs; More than 60,000 Rs Note that the bottom income category in the Relative Poverty Condition has a very high threshold, meaning that many people will place themselves in this category. Conversely, people making less than 15,000 Rs a month will be able to place themselves in the bottom four categories in the Relative Wealth Condition. The experiment worked as expected, with 39.3% of respondents placing themselves in the bottom income category in the Relative Poverty Condition, as compared to 4.4% in the Relative Wealth Condition. Accordingly, because people are more likely to assign themselves to the "bottom" income category in the Relative Poverty Condition, they will be made to feel poorer relative to other Pakistanis. Actual socio-economic status measured in terms of monthly household expenditures pre-treatment is almost identical in these two conditions (Relative Wealth Condition: 16,373 Rs; Relative Poverty Condition: 16,577 Rs; p = .54).
This design builds on work by similar designs employed by scholars examining how subjective relative income affects behaviors such as lottery ticket purchases and sexual trafficking (Haisley, Mostafa and Loewenstein 2008; Mo 2013) . Research in psychology, economics, and decision-making has repeatedly found that people do not evaluate their income in absolute terms when making choices but rather relative to social comparison groups (e.g. , Festinger 1954; Crosby 1976) , and that reference points can profoundly affect how people perceive their current situation (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) .
Statistical Analysis
To assess whether being made to feel more poor increased support for militant groups, we estimate the following OLS regression model:
where all other variables are defined as they are in equation (1) and T i is a dummy variable coded "1" if the respondent is assigned to the Relative Wealth Condition and "0" if the respondent is assigned to the Relative Poverty Condition. The parameter of interest is λ, which estimates the difference-in-difference (DID) in the endorsement effects across conditions in the Relative Poverty Experiment. In other words, is the endorsement effect stronger when people are made to feel relatively poor? As above, we cluster standard errors by PSU.
The Perceived Violence Experiment
In the Perceived Violence Experiment, we manipulated whether people thought that Pakistan was a relatively violent state. The goal in the experiment was to provide respondents with different reference points with which to assess how violent Pakistan is compared to other countries with the aim of manipulating perceptions of violence. As with the Relative Poverty Experiment, the goal was to manipulate the reference point to which people were making comparisons (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . Some people were provided with a high reference point (a country that made Pakistan look non-violent in comparison) while others were provided with a low reference point (a country that made Pakistan look violent in comparison). Respondents were randomly assigned at the PSU level to one of two conditions where the only difference is how levels of violence in Pakistan are framed relative to another South Asian country. In one version, we frame Pakistan as being relatively more violent than Bangladesh. In the other, we frame Pakistan as being relatively less violent than Afghanistan. 11
• Low Violence Condition. "We want you to get your views on a range of challenges facing
Pakistan. As you know, Pakistan has faced a number of economic challenges lately, including major floods each of the last two years, as well as high oil prices and the poor world economy.
11 In this context it was critical that the manipulations be truthful and so we could not hold the country constant.
Pakistan has also suffered from instability and violence. In fact, on average, Pakistan suffers from less extremist violence than Afghanistan."
• High Violence Condition. "We want you to get your views on a range of challenges facing Pakistan. As you know, Pakistan has faced a number of economic challenges lately, including major floods each of the last two years, as well as high oil prices and the poor world economy.
Pakistan has also suffered from instability and violence. In fact, on average, Pakistan suffers from more extremist violence than Bangladesh."
To analyze the Perceived Violence Experiment, we use the same statistical model represented by equation (2) except that now T i is a dummy variable with "1" indicating that the respondent was assigned to the High Violence Condition and "0" indicating that the respondent was assigned to the Low Violence Condition. The parameter estimate of λ tells us whether support for militant groups (as revealed through the endorsement effect) is greater when people feel that Pakistan is a relatively violent country.
Because the Relative Poverty and Perceived Violence Experiments were randomly manipulated, we effectively have a 2 x 2 design containing four cells (relative wealth/low violence, relative poverty/low violence, relative wealth/high violence, relative poverty/high violence). Hence, we can assess how poverty and violence interact in explaining support for militant groups. We can estimate a similar equation to (2) except we include three dummy variables indicating which experimental cell the respondent was assigned to (setting the relative wealth/low violence group as the baseline category), and interact the endorsement cue with each of the three dummy variables. This allows us to estimate the endorsement effect for each poverty/violence combination, and compare the groups to one another. In particular, we can assess whether exposure to both poverty and violence is especially meaningful.
The randomization procedures appeared to work properly. As shown in Appendix Figures 1-3 , the experimental conditions are well balanced on pre-treatment demographic covariates for the Endorsement, Relative Poverty, and Perceived Violence Experiments.
Results
Because we are analyzing simple experiments, we follow Kastellec and Leoni (2007) and present our results graphically, plotting the treatment effects and associated 90% confidence intervals. M il it a n t G r o u p A v e r a g e S ip a h − e − S a h a b a P a k is t a n P a k is t a n T a li b a n A f g h a n T a li b a n Endorsement Effect Readers more accustomed to tables can find the results presented in tabular form in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 , which also include estimates controlling for respondent demographics.
Before delving into the Relative Poverty and Perceived Violence Experiments, which form the core of our study, we present the endorsement effect results which constitute our dependent variable of interest. As shown in Figure 1(a) , the endorsement effects for the three groups were slightly negative, averaging about -1.0%. In other words, associating a policy with an endorsement from a militant group reduced support for the policies by about 1 percentage point on the 0-1 scale.
Of course, we cannot interpret this effect directly since we are pooling respondents who received different treatments, and the experimental stimuli may have affected support for militancy in different ways.
The diagnostic checks suggest that the Endorsement Experiment is functioning as we would expect. As shown in Figure 1 (b), Edhi's endorsement boosted support for the policies by 1.7%.
The first diagnostic check was to see if people who expressed explicit support for Edhi had more positive endorsement effects than those who did not. As illustrated in the figure, among respondents who said that they supported Edhi "a great deal" or "a lot," his endorsement increased the support for their policies by 3.1%, which we can significantly distinguish from zero (p = .08) Conversely, among respondents who reported less explicit support for Edhi, the endorsements had very close to a zero effect. We will use this 3.1% endorsement effect as a benchmark with which to compare other endorsement effects for which we do not have direct questions for comparison. The experiment passed the second diagnostic check as well. In Figure 1(a) we also plot the point estimates of the endorsement experiments for respondents who were: (1) Feelings of relative poverty decreased support for militant political organizations in Pakistan.
Before discussing the experimental results, we first present observational findings showing the endorsement effects by different levels of actual poverty. Doing so allows us to benchmark our results against an observational baseline comparable to prior work. Because the income question included the manipulation of the Relative Poverty Experiment, we could not use it to assess how rich or poor respondents actually were. Instead, we use a pre-treatment question on their monthly household expenditures: "Thinking about all the things you and your family spend money on, how much money in cash did you and your family spend in the last month?" We then took this continuous response and classified respondents as "upper class" (top 20%), "middle class" (middle 60%), and "lower class" (bottom 20%), where percentiles are calculated within province and strata (urban/rural) as in . As illustrated in Figure 2 (a), lower class respondents exhibited significantly negative endorsement effects (-4.2%, p = .05). 13 The higher income groups exhibited greater support, although the endorsement effects are not distinguishable from zero (2.4%, p = .22). These findings are broadly consistent with , who found that the poorest individuals in Pakistan were most negative toward the groups. However, as in , these are simply descriptive results. We cannot interpret them as causal since there may be omitted variables correlated with both SES and support for militant organizations. Support for the militant groups is lowest when people were exposed to both the poverty and violence treatments. As shown in Figure 4 (a), respondents who were in both the Relative Poverty and High Violence conditions had the most significantly negative endorsement effects (-11.18%, p = .003), an extremely substantively large effect, exceeding 3.6 times the Edhi effect. The respondents in the other three experimental cells had higher endorsement effects, and all three are indistinguish- 
Discussion
Addressing the extant literature on the effects of economic status on political violence, we analyzed the relationship between socioeconomic status, perceived levels of violence, and support for militant organizations in Pakistan.
To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale experimental evidence that there is a causal relationship between relative poverty, perceived violence, and levels of support for violent organizations in the developing world. 16 While consistent with much of the academic literature, the causal effect is in the opposite direction of the conventional wisdom: when people are made to feel relatively poor they become less supportive of violent organizations. Combined with the fact that individuals dislike militant organizations more when told that Pakistan is violent than its neighbors, these findings provides strong evidence for the idea that support for violent organizations is conditioned in large part on the costs they impose.
In many respects this conclusion confirms the links between militant behavior and attitudes posited in a range of previous studies. Condra and Shapiro (2012) and Condra et al. (2010) Our work suggests several avenues for future research. First, future work should study the correlation between non-combatant attitudes and realized militant violence. The set of places where one can independently observe both militant violence and civilian attitudes is small, but non-zero, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Palestine. As it seems unlikely that scholars will be able to identify sources of variation in attitudes that are likely to be uncorrelated with trends in the conflict except through their impact on attitudes, more complete structural models of the relationship between attitudes and conflict will likely be required. 17
Second, as and Third, policy makers concerned with support for extremist groups should continue to aggressively publicize the consequences of these groups' actions. A range of studies have now shown that support for violent groups goes down when people feel more strongly the costs of militancy.
Building knowledge about the costs of militant violence should be a staple of media campaigns designed to counter violent extremism. To the extent that it is the willingness of non-combatants to share information on these groups which most strongly constrains their ability to act, then helping citizens understand how much harm such groups do should lead to lower violence and less suffering.
17 For example, one might enrich the notion of norms of non-cooperation introduced in Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2011) and attempt to calibrate a variant of that model using data from Afghanistan.
18 This is a very active area of research, but some standouts include Blair and Imai (2012) ; Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2011); Glynn (2013) . 
